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Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax
Theory: Do Misallocations Drive
Out Inequities?
BORIS I. BITK R*
The standard traditionally employed by tax theorists in assess-
ing the federal income tax is equity, but a new generation of theo-
rists argues that ostensible inequities are converted by the
market into inefficiencies. These opposing theories are based on
divergent behavioral assumptions: equity theorists usually as-
sume that the economic burden of the tax falls on the nominal
taxpayer, while efficiency theorists usually assume that the bur-
den is partly or wholly shifted by the nominal taxpayer to cus-
tomers, suppliers, or others. This article examines the
relationship of these conflicting assumptions to the conclusions
reached by equity and efficiency theorists.
Traditionally, equity has been the standard applied by tax theo-
rists to the structural details of the federal income tax. Equity
theorists ask whether existing law treats equals equally (horizon-
tal equity) and whether it differentiates appropriately among une-
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quals (vertical equity). To determine whether taxpayers or
groups of taxpayers are equals or unequals, equity theorists com-
pare their pretax economic incomes. When equity theorists sub-
ject the Internal Revenue Code to this mode of analysis, most if
not all of them find it woefully defective.
Equity is now being supplemented, even supplanted, by effi-
ciency as the goal of economic policy. This mode of analysis asks
whether the tax allowances of existing law promote or inhibit the
efficient allocation of resources. Viewing existing tax law from
this vantage point, efficiency theorists are as critical of its numer-
ous exclusions, deductions, credits, and other allowances as are
equity theorists.
Although the verdicts of these two schools of income tax analy-
sis converge, I hope to show first, that the behavioral assumptions
on which their conclusions rest are so contradictory that their in-
dependent verdicts challenge-rather than reinforce-each other;
second, that efficiency theory, if valid, calls into question the
methodology employed by equity analysis in testing for horizon-
tal and vertical equity; and third, that a fundamental task of in-
come tax theory is to integrate these normative standards into a
general theory.
In calling equity the "traditional normative standard" for judg-
ing the propriety of exclusions, deductions, credits, and other tax
allowances, I have in mind such honored names as Seligman,
Haig, and, above all, Henry Simons-the only one of the three
who wrote long enough after the vaguely defined "income tax"
had been converted into a statutory reality to have a detailed
charter before him for systematic analysis.
The influence of equity analysis has been pervasive. Examples
of its application include the original McGovern tax plan, Treas-
ury studies of the tax liabilities of taxpayer economic income over
$200,000, the minimum tax on tax preferences, and countless other
tax reform proposals.' Although equity theory is primarily con-
cerned with the individual income tax, it also has inspired recent
studies of the divergent tax rates to which corporations in differ-
ent industries are subject.2
1. For the McGovern plan, see Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political
Rhetoric, 71 ICH. L. REv. 1099, 1123-27 (1973); for high-income, low-tax individuals,
see S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2897, 3439-4117, and in 1976-3 C.B. 49; HOUSE COUTIrrrE ON WAYS AND
TIEANs AND SENATE FINANCE COMITTEE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., TAx REFORM STUD-
is AND PRoposALs, pt. 1, at 79 (Comm. Print 1969); for the minimum tax on tax
preferences, see I.R.C. §§ 56-58.
2. See OFcE OF TAx ANALYSIS, TREASURY DEP'T, EFFECTIVE INcoM TAX
RATES PAID BY U.S. CORPORATIONS IN 1972 (1978); Kaplan, Effective Corporate Tax
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Whereas equity theorists condemn most tax allowances for im-
posing divergent tax burdens on taxpayers with equal economic
incomes, efficiency theorists blame many of the same allowances
for causing the misallocation of resources. An important differ-
ence so far as public attention is concerned, however, is that effi-
ciency theorists have not succeeded in coining any passionate
slogans to rival those contributed by equity theorists, such as
"upside-down subsidies" and "tax relief for the rich." The domi-
nant tone of efficiency analysis is prudence, stemming from wor-
ries about the misallocation of resources, and this attitude is not
easily converted into a fighting creed.
Efficiency analysis is associated primarily with a new genera-
tion of tax theorists whose elders tend to be faithful instead to eq-
uity analysis. This situation is reminiscent of my colleague Leon
Lipson's characterization, a decade ago, of the Yale Law School
faculty as a combination of "Old Turks" and "young fogies"-a
generation of idealists in their sunset years, still inspired by the
ethics of compassion adopted in their youth, and a rising genera-
tion of skeptics insisting on the prudent calculation of costs
before embarking on new ventures or endorsing old ones. There
are, of course, some tax theorists who resist this bipolar classifica-
tion; every taxonomy is a Procrustean bed. By and large, how-
ever, equity and efficiency as modes of tax analysis are separated
by a generational line as well as an intellectual one.3 In saying
this, I have our own day in mind. Taking a longer view, one might
find that today's efficiency theorists differ from their parents but
resemble their grandparents. 4
Rates, 2 J. CoRP. TAX. 187 (1975); 124 CONG. REC. E 168 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1978) (re-
marks of Rep. Vanik).
3. For what it is worth, I count myself as a troubled Old Turk whose chagrin,
if my doubts about conventional equity analysis can be refuted, would be out-
weighed by the pleasure of having my faith resuscitated.
I am indebted to Henry Aaron for helping to clarify my thinking in this area
with an exchange of letters in 1972 and 1973. For a more systematic analysis, see
Bailey, Progressivity and Investment Yields Under U.S. Income Taxation, 82 J. Po-
LmnCAL ECON. 1157 (1974). Bailey concludes that "apparent horizontal inequities
[in income tax burdens] as a rule shake out in competitive resource allocation and
translate into misuse of resources." Id. at 1174. See also Feldstein, On the Theory
of Tax Reform, 6 J. PuB. ECON. 77, 90-102 (1976) (arguing that optimal tax reforms
lead to a different tax structure than optimal de novo design when the effects of
current rules on efficiency, horizontal equity, and property rights are taken into
account).
4. See, e.g., the views regarding the shifting of "special taxes on income" in
E. SELIGMAN, STUDIES IN PUBLIC FINANCE 65-68 (1925).
THE COMPETING BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS
As suggested, equity and efficiency as normative standards rest
on divergent assumptions about the effect of tax allowances on
the behavior of taxpayers and the citizenry as a whole.
The behavioral effect usually posited by equity-oriented theo-
rists (more often implicitly than explicitly) is either that taxpay-
ers continue to do just what they would have done without the
allowances or that any changes in economic conduct to take ad-
vantage of the allowances do not significantly alter the pretax
yield or other economic benefits produced by the tax-favored be-
havior. It is assumed, in other words, that the soup need not be
watered down, no matter how many taxpayers line up for the free
lunch. Indeed, unless the after-tax benefit of a tax-sheltered ac-
tivity is greater than the after-tax benefits of its unsheltered coun-
terparts, it cannot produce horizontal inequity. Equity theory's
behavioral premise is, therefore, reminiscent of the classical the-
ory that the burden of an income tax cannot be shifted and hence
remains on the nominal taxpayer.
The basic behavioral assumption of efficiency theory differs
from that of equity theory in two respects: It is more likely to be
explicit, and it presupposes an increase of tax-favored behavior at
the expense of its unfavored alternative until the after-tax bene-
fits of the two are equalized. This equalization assumption is as
central to efficiency theory as it is damaging to equity theory.
As a standard for judging the income tax, efficiency does not, of
course, require the behavioral assumption just described. One
can envision an efficiency theorist who, upon inspecting the ex-
clusions, deductions, and other tax allowances of existing law, an-
nounces that these allowances do not induce an inefficient
misallocation of resources because taxpayers either do not
change their behavior under the impetus of the allowances or, if
they do, no difference in economic yield results. An efficiency
theorist, in short, might hold that the allowances are harmless
from a resource-allocation perspective and that, if they are objec-
tionable at all, it is only on equity grounds. Conversely, one can
envision the mirror image of this efficiency theorist: an equity
theorist who concludes that the allowances are nullified by de-
clines in the pretax yield of the tax-favored activities and that
they are, therefore, acceptable from an equity point of view, how-
ever much they might distort the allocation of resources.
In real life, however, both schools seem irresistibly drawn to be-
havioral assumptions that warrant gloomy conclusions: Equity
theorists seem drawn to a no-shifting premise that leads them to
the conclusion that existing tax law is horizontally and vertically
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inequitable; efficiency theorists virtually always discern equalized
after-tax yields that are the hallmark of misallocated resources.
COMPETING THEORIES ILLUSTRATED
An illustration will disclose the conflicting implications of the
divergent behavioral assumptions on which the equity and the ef-
ficiency standards rest. The standard classroom example of a vio-
lation of horizontal equity involves a comparison of A and B, both
subject to a marginal tax rate of 70% and both realizing an addi-
tional $1,000 of interest income. Because A invested in taxable in-
dustrial bonds, he pays a tax of $700 and is left with $300. B, being
more tax-conscious, invested in tax-exempt bonds of equal risk,
so his $1,000 of interest is unscathed by any tax liability.
Students sometimes ask why they should be disturbed by this
comparison, which implies that A suffers from a self-inflicted
wound. He is a fool, they suggest, not a victim; let him follow B's
example, and the alleged inequity will vanish. Whatever may be
the reason for the persistent failure of some taxpayers to take ad-
vantage of the tax allowances open to them,5 the instructor usu-
ally answers student objections by asserting that A should not be
forced into unwanted investments in order to be equal to B.
An efficiency theorist, of course, can use this example to
demonstrate that the exclusion generates a misallocation of re-
sources rather than horizontal inequity. If A gets $1,000 of inter-
est from a taxable bond paying 10% per year, he must have
invested $10,000. If B invested the same amount in tax-exempt
bonds, the efficiency theorist points out, B gets only $300 of inter-
est because the after-tax yields of taxable and tax-exempt bonds
are the same in a competitive market-3% on a taxable bond is
the tax-free equivalent of 10% on a taxable bond if the investor is
subject to a 70% marginal tax rate. Because of the resulting
equalization of the after-tax receipts of A and B, no horizontal in-
equity exists between them; both are in the same boat, as they
should be.6 But the ability of cities and states to borrow at 3%
5. See text at 74445 infra.
6. The conventional equity criticism can be rehabilitated, in a purely formal
sense, by the fact that B pays no taxes even if his pretax income drops by the full
amount of unpaid taxes. But this quibble, in turn, is rebutted if the tax allowance
is viewed as a device for (a) taxing the ostensibly exempt income and (b) trans-
ferring the hypothetical tax revenue to the tax-favored borrower. This view of the
tax allowance should be congenial to advocates of tax expenditure analysis, which
when taxable projects of equal risk must pay 10% for capital re-
sults in a misallocation of resources as funds flow toward exempt
projects of lower economic productivity.
At this point, the efficiency theorist's students may note that
the horizontal equity to which their instructor points is produced
by comparing persons who do not have equal amounts of eco-
nomic income: A receives $1,000 of interest; B, only $300. If we re-
turn to the original hypothesis of two taxpayers each with $1,000
of income, the equity theorist's complaint that they do not pay the
same amount of tax seems to regain its original force.
In rebuttal, however, the efficiency theorist lays profane hands
on the sacred ark by asserting that equal economic income, mean-
ing pretax income, is not the proper base for measuring horizon-
tal equity. A and B are equals, he argues, only if they have the
same amount invested at the same risk. Their pretax economic
receipts cannot be properly compared because B's pretax income
reflects B's tax exemption.
The efficiency theorist, therefore, compares A not with B but
with C, who (like A) has $10,000 to invest but who, unlike A, buys
tax-exempt bonds and gets $300 of tax-exempt interest. As for B,
his $1,000 of tax-exempt interest implies an investment of $33,333,
if the interest rate is 3%. Hence, B should be compared not with
A, who has only $10,000 invested, but with D, who (like B) has
$33,333 invested. If D invested $33,333 in taxable bonds with a
10% yield, his after-tax yield is $1,000 (that is, $3,333 less 70% of
$3,333), which is the same amount that B gets from his tax-ex-
empt bonds. If these are the proper comparisons in testing for
horizontal equity, the tax allowance gets a clean bill of health be-
cause A and C, with equal amounts invested, enjoy the same af-
ter-tax yield, and so do B and D.
These comparisons are restricted to investment income. How
are they affected when income from personal services is intro-
duced into the examples?
Traditional equity analysis offers, as further evidence that hori-
zontal equity is violated by the tax exemption accorded to state
and municipal bond interest, the case of X, a taxpayer who (like
A, B, C, and D) is subject to a 70% marginal rate of tax and who
treats foregone taxes as tantamount to appropriations to the tax-favored function,
See Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act
of 1974, 17 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 679, 703 (1976), for the argument that imput-
ing a tax equal to foregone income (that is, the tax-induced reduction in pretax
yields on tax-favored investments) is "not a useful analytic technique for the poli-
cymaker as part of the determination of effective tax rates," although the authors
seemingly accept, id. at 704-05, the concept of foregone income to the extent that it
buttresses their theory that tax expenditures are inefficient.
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earns an additional $1,000 of income from personal services and
who is therefore left with an additional $300 after taxes. When
compared with B ($1,000 of tax-exempt interest), therefore, X is a
victim of horizontal inequity. But the efficiency theorist argues, I
presume, that X's skill, experience, and reputation are compara-
ble to the $10,000 of capital invested by A and C in taxable and
tax-exempt bonds; that X, like them, takes $300 home; and that A,
C, and X, are, therefore, on a plane of horizontal equity.
For a counterpart to B ($1,000 of tax-exempt interest), the effi-
ciency theorist can conjure up Y, whose skill, experience, and
reputation not only are comparable to the $33,333 of financial capi-
tal invested by B and D but enable him to earn $3,333 with the
same time and effort that X must expend to earn $1,000. Left with
$1,000 after tax, Y occupies the same status as B and D, with
whom (the efficiency theorist argues) he is properly comparable.
The conclusions reached by the foregoing efficiency analysis are
shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Effect of Tax Allowance on Taxpayers Subject to 70% Marginal Tax




Taxpayer Source of Income Invested Yield Tax Yield
A Taxable interest $10,000 $1,000 $ 700 $ 300
B Tax-exempt interest 33,333 1,000 - 1,000
C Tax-exempt interest 10,000 300 - 300
D Taxable interest 33,333 3,333 2,333 1,000
X Taxable wages a 1,000 700 300
Y Taxable wages b 3,333 2,333 1,000
aThe human capital of X is equivalent to $10,000 of financial capital
bThe human capital of Y is equivalent to $33,333 of financial capital.
Employing the same methods and standards of comparison, an
efficiency theorist finds that the results set out in Table 1 are con-
sistent with vertical, as well as horizontal, equity. For this pur-
pose, assume four taxpayers-A', D', X', and Y-all of whom are
subject to a 50% marginal tax rate, and all of whom realize addi-
tional income in the same amounts and from the same sources as
their 70% counterparts, A, D, X, and Y. Their tax liabilities and
after-tax incomes are set out in Table 2.
Table 2. Tax Liabilities and After-Tax Incomes of Taxpayers Subject to 50% Mar-
ginal Tax Rate











aThe human capital of X' is equivalent to $10,000 of financial capital.
bThe human capital of r" is equivalent to $33,333 of financial capital.
When A' and X' (both having $500 of after-tax yield from their
pretax income of $1,000) are compared with A and X, the two
pairs are separated by the "proper" distance because the first pair
is subject to a 50% tax rate and the second to a 70% rate. Because
it is foolish for a taxpayer subject to a 50% marginal rate to invest
in tax-exempt bonds paying only 3%, no realistic 50% analogues
to C exist. But if A, C, and X are on a plane of horizontal equity,
all three of them must also occupy a plane of vertical equity when
compared with A' and X'. By a parity of reasoning, because D'
and Y' are properly separated from D and Y, they are also prop-
erly distinguished from B.
Although efficiency analysis thus results in favorable judgments
on both vertical and horizontal equity, conventional equity analy-
sis results in entirely different verdicts:
1. Horizontal equity is violated because B has the same
pretax income as A and X ($1,000) and is subject in the-
ory to the same marginal tax rate (70%), but pays no
tax.
2. Vertical equity is violated because A', D', X, and Y'
pay taxes at the marginal rate of 50%, while B and C,
who in theory are subject to a higher rate (70%), pay no
taxes.
THE TRICKLE-UP PHENOMENON
A recent analysis of tax-exempt interest offers a trickle-up the-
ory of the exclusion's impact.7 A brief examination of the rela-
tionship of this theory to equity and efficiency as normative
standards is in order. Acknowledging that the benefit of the ex-
clusion is competed away (and inures wholly to the borrowers) if
7. Ackerman & Ott, An Analysis of the Revenue Effects of Proposed Substi-
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all exempt bonds are purchased by investors subject to the high-
est marginal rate (currently 70%), trickle-up analysis points out
that if bonds must be sold to taxpayers subject to a lower margi-
nal rate (for example, 50%) in order to clear the market, the tax
benefit will be competed away only for this group of investors.
Thus, to compete with 10% industrial bonds and to attract these
50% taxpayers, the exempt securities must pay 5%. For these
taxpayers, therefore, exempt bonds generate no lasting tax bene-
fit; the net yield is 5% whether they buy taxable or exempt bonds.
But for investors in the 70% bracket, exempt bonds offer a wind-
fall profit of two percentage points above the after-tax yield of tax-
able bonds (that is, 5% tax-free versus 3% after-tax). Thus, the
excess of the interest rate on exempt bonds (5%) over the after-
tax yield on taxable bonds (3%) trickles up to these 70% taxpay-
ers.
This phenomenon should arouse the wrath of both efficiency
and equity theorists because the tax allowance causes both a mis-
allocation of resources (by diverting funds from investments with
a 10% economic yield to investments yielding only 5%) and verti-
cal inequity (that is, the same yield of 5% tax-free to taxpayers
whether their marginal tax rate is 50% or 70%). But efficiency
theorists should find the resulting misallocation less objectiona-
ble than the misallocation that arises when the tax allowance is
monopolized by taxpayers subject to a marginal tax rate of 70%
because that stimulates borrowing for projects producing an eco-
nomic yield of only 3%.8
The relationship of the trickle-up phenomenon to equity analy-
sis is more complicated. Taxpayers at the 70% marginal rate who
buy taxable bonds have only themselves to blame for the result-
ing disparity between their tax liabilities and those of their com-
patriots who invest in tax-exempt bonds. By contrast, taxpayers
at the 50% level enjoy the same yield (5%) in the hypothetical
case just described whether they buy taxable or tax-exempt
8. Equity theorists also offer an "efficiency" objection to tax allowances that
trickle up, but it is totally different from the efficiency theorist's misallocation-of-
resources criticism, discussed in the text. Equity theorists complain that the
trickle-up phenomenon diverts to lenders some of the tax benefit intended by
Congress for borrowers. From an allocation-of-resources point of view, however,
this is a virtue, not a vice; the less the allowance is passed through to borrowers,
the less they will be encouraged to indulge in uneconomic ventures.
bonds; hence, there is no horizontal disparity among these tax-
payers.
Vertical inequity, however, is produced by the trickle-up phe-
nomenon; taxpayers subject to a 70% marginal tax rate who in-
vest in tax-exempt bonds get the same net yield (5%) as
taxpayers subject to a 50% marginal tax rate who buy either taxa-
ble or exempt bonds.
A paradoxical aspect of the trickle-up phenomenon--disre-
garded by equity theorists, as far as I can recall-is that vertical
inequity increases in proportion to the tax allowance's popularity
with low-income taxpayers. If tax-exempt bonds are offered in
such volume that they must be sold to taxpayers subject to a mar-
ginal tax rate of, for example, 30%, the resulting interest rate
(7%) will result in a windfall of four percentage points to top-
bracket taxpayers, in contrast to their two-point advantage when
the market in tax-exempt bonds can be cleared by sales to tax-
payers subject to a 50% marginal tax rate. For the rich, therefore,
the best tax shelters are those that are patronized by the poor; on
the other hand, the more exclusive the club, the less reason to
join.
This conclusion is, of course, wholly contrary to the conven-
tional equity assumption that the most inequitable tax allowances
are those that are confined to top-bracket taxpayers.9 If the
trickle-up theory is valid, an upside-down subsidy (that is, one
that goes exclusively to taxpayers subject to the highest marginal
tax rate) causes a misallocation of resources but no vertical ineq-
uity. From an equity point of view, therefore, converting an up-
side-down allowance into one that is right side up would create,
rather than eliminate, vertical inequity!
DIGRESSION
If the reader will excuse a brief digression, I wish to make two
observations that, though not strictly germane to the foregoing
discussion, are a byproduct of it:
1. The assumption of the trickle-up phenomenon (that some
tax-exempt bonds must be sold to middle-income taxpayers to
clear the market) points up a deficiency in equity analysis that I
wish to record here, without attempting to pursue it further. Hor-
izontal inequity can arise only if some members of the equal-in-
come class fail to take advantage of the allowance; if everyone in a
given income class gravitated toward the allowance, they would
9. See, e.g., Galper & Zimmerman, Preferential Taxation and Portfolio Choice:
Some Empirical Evidence, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 387 (1977).
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all fit into the same boat, leaving no one for us to pity. But we do
not have an adequate theory explaining the stubborn reluctance
of numerous taxpayers in every income class to engage in tax-
sheltered activities that, according to equity analysis, confer bene-
fits at no cost. In particular, why is the appetite of top-bracket
taxpayers for tax-exempt bonds satiated so quickly? Conversely,
why do they buy any taxable bonds, if their aggregate income
from all sources brings the top marginal rate into force?
My economist friends tell me that the purchase of both taxable
and tax-free bonds by top-bracket investors reflects a desire to
avoid risks by diversifying their portfolios. Because tax-free
bonds offer a wide spectrum of risks, with a higher yield at every
risk level than the after-tax yields on taxable bonds of equal qual-
ity, the diversification theory does not persuade me. I am skepti-
cal also about another explanation; namely, differing judgments
about risks. Because the yield on the safest tax-free bonds is
greater than the after-tax yield on the riskiest investment-grade
taxable bonds (conservative, middle-term, tax-free bonds cur-
rently yield almost 6%, while extremely risky taxable 'Junk
bonds" yield less than 15%, or 4.5% after a 70% tax), only an ex-
tremely idiosyncratic judgment about risks could account for a
preference for the latter over the former.
2. Section 265(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which pro-
vides that interest on debt incurred to purchase tax-exempt se-
curities cannot be deducted by the borrower, has been a sacred
cow in the classroom (including mine) for many years, ranking
high on the tax reformer's list .of weapons against tax avoidance.
If the trickle-up phenomenon is valid, however, equity theorists
should call for the repeal of section 265(2). In its absence, top-
bracket taxpayers would find it profitable to purchase tax-exempt
securities so long as the yield was a shade above the net cost of
the borrowed funds--3%, if we assume an interest rate of 10%
and a marginal rate on the taxpayer's income from other sources
of 70%. The resulting increased demand for exempt securities
would force down the rate, thus reducing or eliminating the up-
ward flow of tax benefits. If the demand were large enough, mid-
dle- and low-income taxpayers would be outbid, the market could
be cleared--on the foregoing assumptions-with a 3% yield, and
the entire benefit of the tax exemption would be captured by the
issuers.
DOES THE CONFLICT MATr ER?
If I am right that there is a fundamental conflict between old-
style equity analysis and new-fashioned efficiency analysis, does
the conflict matter? If both groups damn what they see and agree
on the remedy (for example, a tax law based on the Haig-Simons
definition of income), why be concerned if they prefer to reach
their common destination by different roads?
In response, I argue that each group's zeal for tax reform would
(and should) diminish, if not evaporate, if it concluded that the
other group's reason for wanting reform was valid. If the inequity
perceived by equity theorists in a given tax allowance is in fact
converted wholly into a misallocation of resources, a single-
minded equity theorist has no reason to favor its repeal unless he
also objects to governmental interference with marketplace out-
comes. Moreover, some equity theorists might well favor reten-
tion of a tax allowance if persuaded that it alters a particular
marketplace outcome while producing little or no horizontal ineq-
uity. Conversely, a single-minded efficiency theorist has no rea-
son to object on efficiency grounds to a tax allowance changing
the distribution of horizontal tax burdens if the tax allowance
does not alter economic behavior; and particular tax allowances
might be favored by an efficiency theorist who welcomes the re-
sulting change in the distribution of the burden and sees no ad-
verse impact on resource allocations.
TERRA INCOGNITA
In the foregoing discussion, the examples use tax-exempt bond
interest because its exclusion from gross income is one of the few
tax allowances that has been examined extensively by both eq-
uity and efficiency theorists and especially because economists
now seem to agree that a significant part of the tax allowance is
competed away rather than retained by the taxpayer-lender. It is
obvious that wholly different equity and efficiency conclusions
would be reached with respect to tax allowances that do not affect
taxpayer behavior. The $1,000 annual tax exemption for blind tax-
payers is an example; some economists may think that this allow-
ance encourages some taxpayers to neglect their eyes and that it
thereby induces a misallocation of resources (for example, in-
creased dependence on seeing-eye dogs and other after-the-fact
palliatives). However, most economists would more likely agree
that the blindness exemption does not alter the pretax income of
its beneficiaries. If this view is correct, the blindness exemption
raises solely equity issues, untinctured by any misallocation of re-
sources.
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But most tax allowances cannot be readily assigned to one end
or the other of the behavioral spectrum. On reviewing the items
listed in the Tax Expenditure Budget,0 for example, I am sur-
prised at the paucity of reliable data about the extent to which
the ostensible benefits of particular exclusions, deductions, cred-
its, and other allowances remain with, or pass through, the tax-
payers claiming the allowance."
I have focused here on oply one aspect of the problem: the pos-
sibility that market forces transfer the economic benefit of a tax
allowance from the taxpayer-claimant to others. But one must
also consider the possibility that the benefit is impounded by the
early birds and does not pass to later claimants; if a tax allowance
is capitalized when first granted, any resulting inequity may be a
transitional rather than a permanent phenomenon. 2 It should
also be noted that tax allowances can acquire a self-destruct de-
vice from sources other than market forces. For example, if Con-
gress takes into account the exclusion of social security benefits,
military allowances, and other governmental payments from gross
income in fixing the amount of these payments, their exemption
creates horizontal and vertical inequities only by virtue of the
trickle-up phenomenon described earlier.
We know so little that it is perhaps superfluous to mention an-
other source of uncertainty: the difficulty in separating tax al-
lowances from the structural features of a "normal" income tax.
For example, if income taxation alters the pretax trade-off be-
tween work and leisure, are statutory provisions which reduce the
tax on income from personal services (such as the 50% tax ceiling
and the earned income credit) commendable features which miti-
gate a misallocation that is otherwise inherent in the tax itself, or
are they sources of affirmative misallocations? The same ques-
tions can be asked from an equity point of view: If a "pure" in-
10. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FIVE YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS: FIS-
CAL YEARS 1978-82 (1977) (supplement on tax expenditures); OFFICE OF MANAGE-
MENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SPECIAL ANALYSIS G,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 1980, at 183 (1979).
11. Despite the vast body of commentary on the tax shelter epidemic of the
last decade, for example, there are no measures by tax economists of the influence
of market forces. Was a Texas friend of mine right in saying that any gas or oil
shelter that has to be marketed to Scarsdale orthodontists is a sure loser? If so,
what does that imply about the ostensible tax benefits promised by the invest-
ment?
12. See Bittker, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization, or Does the Early Bird
Get a Free Lunch?, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 416 (1975).
come tax is biased against labor, do these allowances correct, or
create, an inequity?
CONCLUSION
It is hard to see how the normative standards favored by either
equity or efficiency theorists can be applied with confidence to ex-
isting law while the behavioral consequences of most tax al-
lowances remain terra incognita. Only when they are mapped
will we be able to say with assurance whether particular tax al-
lowances generate inequities, misallocations, or some of each.
Until then, intuition and political preferences must be the basis
for analysis because scholars, alas, can legitimately claim little
more authority than the average citizen.
